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Abstract
One of the common methods to synchronize threads in multi-threaded
programs is using condition variables, where calling the wait command
for a condition variable blocks the caller thread and signaling a condition
variable wakes all the blocked threads waiting for that condition vari-
able up. One potential problem with these programs is that a waiting
thread might be blocked forever leading the program to deadlock. In this
report a verification approach for deadlock freedom of such programs is
presented. In this approach each condition variable has a corresponding
ghost value, namely cvg, such that when a condition variable is created
and a wait command for that variable is called the corresponding cvg is
non-negative and non-positive, respectively. Calling a wait command for
a condition variable also requires a credit for that variable, where a credit
for a condition variable can be achieved when a thread increments the
corresponding cvg and also signals that condition variable if the old value
of cvg was zero. We are now developing a Coq formalization to formally
prove soundness of the presented approach.
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been growing interest in termination verification of programs
[1, 2]. Some other verification approaches have been also introduced to prove
deadlock freedom and finite blocking of non-terminating programs [3, 4]. To
the best of our knowledge, none of the presented approaches are applicable for
∗This work was funded by Flemish Research Fund (FWO) grant G.0058.13 and by KU
Leuven Research Fund (Onderzoeksraad) grant OT/13/065.
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the programs that use condition variables. These variables are widely used to
synchronize the execution of threads in multi-threaded environments. However,
one potential problem with these programs is infinite blocking of the threads
waiting to be signaled that leads to deadlock.
To clarify the problem consider the following producer/consumer example
in which the condition variable v protects the consumer from reading from an
empty buffer. The consumer first acquires the related lock and while there is no
item in the buffer it releases the lock, blocks itself and waits for a signal v from
the producer. If the consumer wakes up while the buffer is not empty it takes
one item out of the buffer and finally releases the related lock. The producer
also acquires the same lock, signals all the threads waiting for v if the buffer
is currently empty, puts an item on the buffer, and lastly releases the acquired
lock.
routine main()
{
q := newqueue;
l := newlock;
v := newcvar;
b := buffer{q:=q, l:=l, v:=v};
fork (consumer(b));
producer(b);
freecvar(b.v);
freelock(b.l);
freequeue(b.q);
}
routine producer(buffer b)
{
lock acquire(b.l);
if (sizeof(b.q) = 0)
signalAll(b.v);
enqueue(b.q, ”data”);
lock release(b.l);
}
routine consumer(buffer b)
{
lock acquire(b.l);
while(sizeof(b.q) = 0)
wait(b.v, b.l);
dequeue(b.q);
lock release(b.l);
}
This program is deadlock-free. However, it is easy to construct some varia-
tions of this program that deadlock: if there are more than one consumer in the
environment, or if the consumer waits for the condition variable even when the
buffer is not empty, or if there is a cycle in the wait-for graph of the program.
2 Verification of Deadlock Freedom
In order to verify deadlock freedom of programs that use condition variables,
the main idea presented in this paper is to associate each condition variable v
with a ghost value, namely cvg, such that the value of this variable when v is
created is non-negative and when wait(v, l) is called is non-positive. For the
producer/consumer program, for example, the size of the queue is the cvg of
the condition variable v, since it meets both requirements. A wait(v, l) com-
mand is successfully verified if the executing thread possesses a credit for v,
where a credit for a condition variable v can be produced when cvg of v is
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incremented and a signalAll(v) is also executed if the cvg changes to 1. It is
possible to feed multiple wait commands, even in different threads1, with this
credit. Consequently, if there are some threads in the program waiting for a sig-
nal, then there is definitely one thread responsible for signaling these threads.
Additionally, no thread is allowed to decrement the cvg of v except if it spends
one credit(v) for that decrement. This constrain ensures that if after signaling a
condition variable a third thread decrements the value of cvg to a non-positive
value, leading the waiting threads to be blocked again, then there is another
thread responsible for signaling the blocked threads.
The only remaining problem is the existence of a cycle in the wait-for graph
of the program. To resolve this problem a waiting level is assigned to each
condition variable and also each lock, such that a thread t is allowed to acquire
a lock z or wait for a condition variable z if the waiting level of z is strictly
lower than the waiting levels of all the locks and condition variables that t is
expected to release and signal, respectively. The set of these locks and condition
variables is called the obligations of the thread t and should be empty when t
terminates. Accordingly, a lock is added/removed to/from the set of obligations
of the current thread when it is acquired/released. A thread t can also produce
a credit for a condition variable if it loads that condition variable to the set of its
obligations. The produced credit can be used to feed and verify another thread
that requires this credit. The thread t can later unloads this condition variable
obligation from the set of its obligations if it either produces and spends a credit
for this obligation or delegates this obligation to another thread.
In the remainder of this section we first define the syntax of our programming
language and its operational semantics. Then, we introduce the notions of
assertions, permission heaps, and satisfaction, a relation relating an assertion
to a permission heap. Finally, we present the appropriate proof rules to verify
programs against accessing dangling pointers, race conditions and also deadlock.
At the end of this section we verify the producer/consumer example according
to the presented proof rules.
2.1 Syntax of Programs
An expression can be an integer number z, a variable x, or addition of two other
expressions. Each closed expression e can be evaluated to an integer, denoted
by JeK, such that JzK=z, JxK=0, and Je1+e2K=Je1K+Je2K. A command can be
val z, indicating a single value, or cons(e), that allocates a part of memory, setsJeK as its content, and returns the allocated address, or free(e), that deallocates
the memory at the address JeK, or lookup(e), that returns the content of the
memory at JeK, or mutate(e1, e2), that sets the content of the memory at Je1K toJe2K, or fork(c), that forks a new thread c, or let x:=c1 in c2, that first executes
c1 and then substitutes any occurrence of x in c2 with the resulting value of
execution of c1, or newlock, that creates a new lock, or freelock(l), that destroys
1It is possible to give a credit to a thread and also get it back when the thread terminates.
However, in this version of the paper we do not cover the latter case, where the possessions
of the forked thread, such as its credits, are given back to the forking thread.
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lock l, or acquire(l), that acquires lock l if it has not been already acquired, or
release(l), that releases lock l, or newcvar, that creates a new condition variable,
or freecvar(v), that destroys the condition variable v, or wait(v, l), that releases
the lock l and blocks the calling thread until it receives a signal v, or signalAll(v),
that signals all the threads waiting for the condition variable v. The command
asleep(d, l) is an implicit command indicating that the current thread has exe-
cuted the wait(v, l) command and is not signaled yet. A command can also be a
ghost command that does not change the heap and is only used for verification
purposes. These commands will be explained in the subsequent sections.
c ∈ Commands, e ∈ Expressions, x ∈ Vars, z ∈ Z, n ∈ N
e ::= z | x | e1+e2
c ::= val z | cons(e) | free(e) | lookup(e) | mutate(e1, e2)
| fork(c) | let x := c1 in c2
| newlock | acquire(x) | release(x) | freelock(x)
| newcvar | wait(x, x′) | signalAll(x) | freecvar(x)
| asleep(z, z′) | gc
gc ::= g loadobs(z) | g unloadobs(z) | g loadcredit(z) | g unloadcredit(z)
| g initlock(z)
2.2 Semantics of Programs
A small step changes the current configuration κ to the new one by executing a
thread with the identification id in κ. A configuration is a pair of heaps-thread
tables, where heaps and thread tables are some partial functions from locations
and thread ids to integers and commands, respectively.
h ∈ Heaps = Locations ⇀ Z
t ∈ ThreadTables = ThreadIDs ⇀ Commands
κ ∈ Configurations = ThreadTables×Heaps
The semantics of programs is defined as follows, where wkup(t, v) changes all
the threads waiting for the condition variable v, indicated by asleep(v, l), to
acquire(l), and lift of a value v w.r.t. the default value v′, denoted by bvcv′ , is
defined such that bvcv′=v and b∅cv′ = v′.
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(t[id:=val v], h) id (t[id:=∅], h)
(t[id:=cons(e), h[z:=∅]) id (t[id:=val z], h[z:=JeK])
(t[id:=free(e)], h) id (t[id:=val 0], h[JeK:=∅])
(t[id:=lookup(e)], h) id (t[id:=val bh JeKc0], h)
(t[id:=mutate(e1, e2)], h) id (t[id:=val 0], h[Je1K:=Je2K])
(t[id:=fork(c), id′:=∅], h) id (t[id:=val 0, id′:=c], h)
(t[id:=let x:=c1 in c2], h) id (t′[id:=let x:=c′1 in c2], h′)
if (t[id:=c1], h) id (t′[id:=c′1], h′)
(t[id:=let x:=val v in c], h) id (t[id:=c[v/x]], h)
(t[id:=newlock], h[z:=∅]) id (t[id:=val z], h[z:=1])
(t[id:=acquire z], h[z:=1]) id (t[id:=val 0], h[z:=0])
(t[id:=release z], h) id (t[id:=val 0], h[z:=1])
(t[id:=freelock z], h) id (t[id:=val 0], h[z:=∅])
(t[id:=newcvar], h[z:=∅]) id (t[id:=val z], h[z:=0])
(t[id:=wait(v, l)], h) id (t[id:=asleep(v, l)], h[l:=1])
(t[id:=signalAll(v)], h) id (wkup(t, v)[id:=val 0], h])
(t[id:=freecvar z], h) id (t[id:=val 0], h[z:=∅])
(t[id:=gc], h) id (t[id:=val 0], h)
2.3 Permission Heaps
A permission heap is a partial function that maps a location to a knowledge
on that location with a fraction indicating the percentage of possession of that
location by the heap. This knowledge indicates that the given location is the
address of an integer, a lock, or a condition variable. For the two last cases it
also represents the related waiting level of that lock/condition variable. If the
location is the address of a lock it also shows the invariant of that lock, the list
of condition variables and their waiting levels protected by that lock and also
their expected cvg values when the lock is going to be released, if it has been
already acquired. Note that the lock invariant is a function that given the cvg
values of its condition variables returns the assertion representing the resources
that are protected by that lock.
pi ∈ Fractions o ∈ Obligations = Z→ N
w ∈Wlevels = N g ∈ Cvg = Z⇀ Z
i ∈ Invariants = Cvg → Assertions D ∈ Cvgdom = Z× N
p ∈ PHeaps = Locations ⇀ Fractions ×Knowledge
k ∈ Knowledge = Z+ (Wlevels × ((∅× Inv .)× Cvgdom × (∅+ Cvg)) +∅)
Two permission heaps can be added, denoted by ⊕, if for each location that is
allocated in both heaps the addition of fractions does not exceed one and their
knowledge does not contradict each other. These principles are formally defined
as follows:
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p1 ⊕ p2 = p2 ⊕ p1 = λz. (p1 z)⊕′ (p2 z)
if p1 ⊥ p2
(pi, k) ⊕′ ∅ = (pi, k)
(pi1, z) ⊕′ (pi2, z) = (pi1+pi2, z)
(pi1, w, i,D, g) ⊕′ (pi2, w2, i2, D2,∅) = (pi1+pi2, w, i,D, g)
(pi1, w, i,D,∅) ⊕′ (pi2, w2, i2, D2,∅) = (pi1+pi2, w, i,D,∅)
(pi1, w,∅) ⊕′ (pi2, w2,∅) = (pi1+pi2, w,∅)
p1 ⊥ p2 ⇔ ∀z. p1 z=(pi1, k1) ∧ p2 z=(pi2, k2)
⇒ pi1+pi261 ∧ k1 ⊥′ k2
z ⊥′ z′ ⇔ z=z′
(w1, i1, D1, g) ⊥′ (w2, i2, D2,∅) ⇔ w1=w2 ∧ i1=i2 ∧D1=D2
(w1, i1, D1,∅) ⊥′ (w2, i2, D2,∅) ⇔ w1=w2 ∧ i1=i2 ∧D1=D2
(w1,∅) ⊥′ (w2,∅) ⇔ w1=w2
2.4 Satisfaction Relation
An assertion can be either emp, indicating an empty permission heap, or z
pi7−→ z,
indicating a permission heap that only possesses pi percentage of z and maps it
to z′, or ulock(z, w,D), indicating an uninitialized lock at location z with the
waiting level w that protects condition variables (and their waiting levels) in
D, or lock, indicating a lock, or locked, indicating an acquired lock, or obs(o),
indicating the obligations that the current thread should do, or credit(z), indi-
cating the credits in possession of the current thread, or z ≺ o, indicating z is
lower that the waiting levels of all obligations in o, or ∃, that existentially quan-
tifies over another assertion, or P , indicating that the proposition P holds, or
logical conjunction, logical disjunction, or separating conjunction of two other
assertions.
a ∈ Assertions ::= emp | z pi7−→ z | ulock(z, w,D) | lock(pi, z, w, i,D)
| locked(pi, z, w, i,D, g) | obs(o) | credit(z) | z ≺ o
| ∃(f :(v:A)→ a) | P | a ∧ a | a ∨ a | a ∗ a
2.5 Modeling Permission Heaps
Each assertion models a permission heap p, a multiset of credits d, and m that
is either ∅ or a multiset of obligations. This modeling is indicated as follows,
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where 0=λ .∅, and 0=λ .0.
m, d, p  emp ⇔ m=∅ ∧ d=0 ∧ p=λ .∅
m, d, p  z pi7−→ z′ ⇔ m=∅ ∧ d=0 ∧ p=0[z:=(pi, z′)]
m, d, p  ulock(z, w,D) ⇔ m=∅ ∧ d=0 ∧ p=0[z:=(1, w,∅, D,∅)
, v:=(pi,wv)], where D=(v, wv)
m, d, p  lock(pi, z, w, i,D) ⇔ m=∅ ∧ d=0 ∧ p=0[z:=(pi,w, i,D,∅)
, v:=(pi,wv)], where D=(v, wv)
m, d, p  locked(pi, z, w, i,D, g) ⇔ m=∅ ∧ d=0 ∧ p=0[z:=(pi,w, i,D, g)
, v:=(pi,wv)], where D=(v, wv)
m, d, p  obs(o) ⇔ m = o ∧ d=0 ∧ p=λ .∅
m, d, p  credit(z) ⇔ m=∅ ∧ d=0[z:=1] ∧ p=λ .∅
m, d, p  w ≺ o ⇔ ∀z∈o. ∃pi,w, k. p z=(pi,w, k) ∧ w<w′
m, d, p  ∃(f) ⇔ ∃z. m, d, p  f z
m, d, p  P ⇔ P
m, d, p  a ∧ a′ ⇔ m, d, p  a ∧ m, d, p  a′
m, d, p  a ∨ a′ ⇔ m, d, p  a ∨ m, d, p  a′
m, d, p  a ∗ a′ ⇔ ∃m1,m2, d1, d2, p1, p2. m = m1⊗m2 ∧
d = λz. d1 z+d2 z ∧ p = p1⊕p2 ∧
m1, d1, p1  a ∧ m2, d2, p2  a′
where m⊕∅=∅⊕m=m
a  a′ ⇔ ∀m d p. m, d, p  a ⇒ m, d, p  a′
2.6 Proof Rules
The following proof rules make sure that 1) no dangling pointer will be accessed,
and 2) no race condition will occur, and 3) the program never deadlocks. The
rules for the commands cons, free, lookup, and mutate ensure that no dangling
pointer is accessed and a memory cell cannot be accessed/written when it is
concurrently being written/accessed by another thread. The rule fork implies
that a thread can delegate a part of its permissions and obligations to the
forked thread provided that the forked thread discharges all of the delegated
obligations. Executing a newlock command will produce an uninitialized lock
assertion with an arbitrary waiting level for that lock. This assertion can be
changed to a normal lock assertion later when its invariant, that must not
contain any obs or credit assertion, holds with some non-negative values as the
cvg values of its condition variables. This transition can be done by the ghost
command g initlock. The rule acqure(l) makes sure that the waiting level of l is
lower that the waiting levels of obligations of the current thread and l is not a
dangling pointer. Additionally, it adds l to the list of obligations, implying that
this thread should not wait for any resource with a higher/equal waiting level
before releasing that lock. This rule also provides the invariant of the lock for
the subsequent commands. The rule release(l) discharges the obligation l and
makes sure that the invariant still holds with some appropriate cvg values at the
end of the critical section. By the appropriate values we mean those that are
not changed since the lock was acquired, or those that are changed under some
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specific circumstances. These circumstances are indicated in the rules g dec and
g inc. The former ensures that no thread decrements cvg of a condition variable
v except if it spends one credit(v) for that decrement, and the latter enables a
thread to produce a credit(v) if that thread increments cvg of v by one while
the old value of cvg is not zero.
Given an uninitialized lock assertion of l, the rule newcvar adds the created
condition variable with an arbitrary waiting level to the list of the condition
variables protected by l. The rule wait(v, l) makes sure that 1) the cvg value
of v is non-positive, and 2) the current thread possesses a credit(v), and 3)
the waiting levels of v and l are lower than the waiting levels of all the thread’s
obligations except for l (note that the wait command releases the lock l and tries
to reacquire it after the thread is signaled), and 4) the invariant of lock l holds,
and 5) wait(v, l) is executed under protection of lock l. The rule signalAll(v) will
produce n instances of credit(v) provided that cvg of v is incremented by n before
releasing the lock. The ghost commands g loado(v) and uloado(v) can be used to
load or unload the condition variable v to the list of obligations and credits of the
current thread. The proof rules also cover the existential generalization, frame,
and consequence rules used in the Hoare logic and separation logic. Note that
g|D ⇔ dom(g)={v|(v, w)∈D}, nocrob(a)⇔ ∀m, d, p. m, d, p  a⇒ m=0∧ o=∅,
v∈1D ⇔ ∃w.(v, w)∈D, D−1v removes any element (d,w) from D.
{emp} val(z) {λr. emp ∧ r=z} {emp} cons(e) {λr. r 17−→JeK}
{JeK 17−→z} free(e) {λ . emp} {JeK pi7−→z} lookup(e) {λr. JeK pi7−→z ∧ r=z}
{Je1K 17−→z} mutate(e1, e2) {λr. Je1K 17−→Je2K}
{a ∗ obs(o)} c {λ . obs{[]}}
{a ∗ obs(ounionmultio′)} fork(c) {λ . obs(o′)}
{a} c1 {a′} ∀z. {a′ z} c2[z/x] {a′′}
{a} let x=c1 in c2 {a′′}
{emp} newlock {λr. ulock(r, w, {})}
{lock(1, l, w, i, {})} freelock(l) {λ . ∃g. i(g)}
{a ∗ lock(pi, l, w, i,D) ∗ obs(o) ∧ w≺o} acquire(l)
{λ . a ∗ obs(ounionmulti{[l]}) ∗ ∃g. locked(pi, l, w, i,D, g) ∗ i(g) ∧ g|D}
{locked(pi, l, w, i,D, g) ∗ i(g) ∗ obs(o)} release(l)
{λ . lock(pi, l, w, i,D) ∗ obs(o−{[l]})}
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{ulock(l, w,D)} newcvar() {λr. ulock(l, w,D∪{(r, wr)}}
{lock(1, l, w, i,D) ∧ d∈1D} freecvar(d) {λ . lock(1, l, w, i,D−1d)}
{(a ∗ locked(pi, l, wl, i,D, g) ∧ wl≺o ∧ ∃wv. (v, wv)∈D ∧ wv≺o) ∗ i(g)
∗credit(v) ∗ obs(ounionmulti{[l]}) ∧ g(v)60}wait(v, l)
{λ . a ∗ credit(v) ∗ obs(ounionmulti{[l]}) ∗ ∃g′. locked(pi, l, wl, i,D, g′) ∗ i(g′) ∧ g′|D}
` {locked(pi, l, w, i,D, g[v:=z])} signalAll(v)
{locked(pi, l, w, i,D, g[v:=z+n]) ∗ {∗ni=1 credit(v)}}
{a} c {a′}
{f ∗ a} c {λr. f ∗ a′(r)}
a  a1 {a1} c {a′1} ∀r. a′1(r)  a′(r)
{a} c {a′}
∀z. {f(z)} c {a}
{∃f} c {a}
{obs(o)} g loado(v) {λ . obs(ounionmulti{[v]}) ∗ credit(v)}
{obs(ounionmulti{[v]}) ∗ credit(v)} g uloado(v) {λ . obs(o)}
{lock(pi, l, w, i,D, g[v:=z]) ∗ credit(v)} g dec(v) {λ . lock(pi, l, w, i,D, g[v:=z−1])}
{lock(pi, l, w, i,D, g[v:=z]) ∧ z 6=0} g inc(v)
{λ . lock(pi, l, w, i,D, g[v:=z+1]) ∗ credit(v)}
{ulock(l, w,D) ∗ i(g) ∧ nocrob(i(g)) ∧ ∀v∈1D. g(v)=|g(v)|} g initlock(l)
{λ . lock(1, l, w, i,D)}
2.7 Verifying the producer/consumer program
The following annotated program indicates how the producer/consumer example
can be verified by the presented proof rules2. Note that l 7→ is a shorthand for
∃z. l 17−→z, where z is not free in l. The verification of the main routine of the
program is started with an empty set of obligations. The waiting levels of the
lock and the condition variable are decided to be 1 and 2, respectively. Since
the consumer thread needs a credit for b.v to be successfully verified, before
forking this thread, the main thread produces a credit b.v by loading b.v to
the list of its obligations and supplies the consumer thread with this credit and
the half its lock assertion. Then it delegates its b.v obligation to the producer
routine, where this obligation is discharged by spending the resulting credit of
the producer. At the end of the verification the main routine has no obligation
left and consequently is successfully verified. Note that a lock assertion can be
divided into half and vice versa, and any assertion can be temporarily removed
from the current assertions with the help of the consequence and frame rules.
2The current proof rules do not cover the join, loops and the conditional commands.
Additionally, they are suitable for the lambda calculus programs. However, the given example
conceptually explains how they can be used to verify a specific program.
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inv(buffer b)(cvar⇀int g) ::= queue(b.q, g(b.v))
routine main()
{
obs{[]}
q := newqueue;
queue(q, 0) ∗ obs{[]}
l := newlock;
ulock(l, 1, {}) ∗ queue(q, 0) ∗ obs{[]}
v := newcvar;
ulock(l, 1, {(v, 2)}) ∗ queue(q, 0) ∗ obs{[]}
b := buffer{q:=q, l:=l, v:=v};
ulock(b.l, 1, {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ queue(b.q, 0) ∗ obs{[]}
g initlock(b.l);
lock(1, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[]} where g=0[b.v:=0]
g loado(b.v);
lock(1, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[b.v]} ∗ credit(b.v)
t := fork (consumer(b));
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[b.v]}
producer(b);
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[]}
join(t);
lock(1, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[]}
freecvar(b.v);
lock(1, b.l, 1, inv(b), {}) ∗ obs{[]}
freelock(b.l);
∃s. queue(b.q, s) ∗ obs{[]}
freequeue(b.q)
obs{[]}
}
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routine producer(buffer b)
{
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[b.v]}
lock acquire(b.l);
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s]) ∗ queue(b.q, s) ∗ obs{[b.v, b.l]}
if (sizeof(b.q) = 0)
signalAll(b.v);
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s+1]) ∗ queue(b.q, s)
∗obs{[b.v, b.l]} ∗ credit(b.v)
if(b.count 6= 0)
g inc(b.v)
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s+1]) ∗ queue(b.q, s)
∗obs{[b.v, b.l]} ∗ credit(b.v)
enqueue(b.q, ”data”);
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s+1]) ∗ queue(b.q, s+1)
∗obs{[b.v, b.l]} ∗ credit(b.v)
lock release(b.l);
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[b.v]} ∗ credit(b.v)
g uloado(b.v)
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[]}
}
routine consumer(buffer b)
{
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ credit(b.v) ∗ obs{[]}
lock acquire(b.l);
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s]) ∗ queue(b.q, s)
∗credit(b.v) ∗ obs{[b.l]}
while(sizeof(b.q) = 0)
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s]) ∗ queue(b.q, s)
∗credit(b.v) ∗ obs{[b.l]} ∧ s=0
wait(b.v, b.l)
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s]) ∗ queue(b.q, s)
∗credit(b.v) ∗ obs{[b.l]}
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s]) ∗ queue(b.q, s)
∗credit(b.v) ∗ obs{[b.l]} ∧ s6=0
dequeue(b.q);
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s]) ∗ queue(b.q, s−1)
∗credit(b.v) ∗ obs{[b.l]} ∧ s6=0
g dec(b.v)
∃s. locked(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}, 0[b.v:=s−1]) ∗ queue(b.q, s−1) ∗ obs{[b.l]}
lock release(b.l);
lock(0.5, b.l, 1, inv(b), {(b.v, 2)}) ∗ obs{[]}
}
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3 Soundness Proof
In this section a high-level soundness proof of the presented approach is pro-
vided.
3.1 Safety of Configuration
Definition 1 (Safety of configuration). A configuration is considered to be safe
if 1) it does not abort, and 2) it is not a deadlock configuration, and 3) execution
of any arbitrary thread leads to a safe configuration too. This property can be
formally defined as follows, where for any configuration κ, safe0 κ always holds.
safe conf κ⇔ ∀n. safen κ
safen κ⇔ ¬ abort κ ∧ nodeadlock κ ∧ ∀id κ′. κ id κ′ ⇒ safen−1 κ′
nodeadlock(t, h)⇔ t 6= 0⇒ ∃id κ′. (t, h) id κ′
A configuration is an abort configuration if 1) any thread in this configuration
accesses a dangling pointer, or 2) two different threads in the configuration
concurrently access and write at the same location, or 3) a thread releases a
lock that has not been already acquired, or 4) a thread frees a lock that has
been acquired.
abort(t[id:=free(e)], h[JeK:=∅])
abort(t[id:=lookup(e)], h[JeK:=∅])
abort(t[id:=mutate(e1, e2)], h[Je1K:=∅])
abort(t[id:=let x:=c1 in c2], h) if abort(t[id:=c1], h)
abort(t[id1:=c1, id2:=c2], h) if access(c1)6=∅∧access(c1)=write(c2)∧id1 6=id2
abort(t[id:=acquire(a)], h[a:=∅])
abort(t[id:=release(a)], h[a6=0])
abort(t[id:=freelock(a)], h[a6=1])
3.2 Soundness of the Proof Rules
For simplicity’s sake in the rest of this section we only prove the deadlock
freedom of programs and focus on the most important parts of the proof. How-
ever, a comprehensive formal proof written in Coq3 can be found on https:
//people.cs.kuleuven.be/~jafar.hamin/dlfree/
4.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the proof rules).
{obs{[]}} c {λ . obs{[]}} ⇒ safe conf (0[id:=c],0)
Proof. The soundness theorem is proved by introducing two intermediate safety
definition, namely safec and safet. The former deals with a single thread and its
local permission heap, and the latter deals with a set of threads and their local
permission heap. Lemmas 3, 5, and 7 are some high-level auxiliary lemmas used
to prove this theorem.
3Some parts of this formalization are inspired by [5]
4This formalization is still under development
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Lemma 3 (Soundness of the proof rules w.r.t. the safety of commands).
{P} c {Q} ⇒ m, d, p  P ⇒ safecn c p m d Q
Proof. By case analysis of the proof rules and induction on n, if required.
Definition 4 (Safety of Commands). safecn c p m d a. A command c in a local
permission heap p with local obligations m and local credits d and postcondtion
a is considered to be safe if and only if:
• Either n = 0
• Or c = val(z) and m, d, p  a(z)
• Or c is neither a value nor a ghost command and n>0 and also 1) if c
is trying to acquire a lock z or waiting for a condition variable z then
the waiting level of z is lower than the waiting levels of all obligations
in m; and 2) if c is waiting for a condition variable v then there exists
at least one credit for v in d; and 3) the following invariants hold during
the execution of c: 3-1) for any lock l that has been acquired, l is in
the (multi)set of global obligations, and 3-2) for any condition vairable v
for which a thread is waiting, v is in the set of global obligations. The
second invariant follows from the constraint number 2 and the following
auxiliary invariants: 3-2-1) ∀v. D(v)6O(v)+cvg(v), where D(v) and O(v)
are the number of occurrences of the condition variable v in the set of
global credits and global obligations, respectively, and cvg(v) is the cvg
value of v, and 3-2-2) for any condition variable v for which a thread is
waiting, cvg(v)60.
• Or c is a ghost command and safen−1 c′ p′ m′ d′ a holds, where c′, p′,m′
and d′ are the effect of execution of the ghost command in c, p,m, and d,
respectively.
Lemma 5 (Soundness of the safety of commands w.r.t. the safety of threads).
safecn c pc oc dc Q ∧ Q |= obs{[]} ∧ safetn t[id:=∅] pt ot dt
⇒ safetn t[id:=c] pt⊕pc otunionmultidoceid dtunionmultidc
where doceid changes each element z∈oc to (id, z).
Proof. By induction on n.
Definition 6 (Safety of threads). safetn t p o d. The set of threads t in a
permission heap p with o as a set of thread id-obligation pairs, and d as a set
of credits is considered to be safe if and only if:
• Either n = 0
• Or t = 0 and o is empty
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• Or n>0 and 1) if any thread tid is trying to acquire a lock z or waiting
for a condition variable z then the waiting level of z is lower than the
waiting levels of obligations of tid in o; and 2) for any thread waiting for
a condition variable v there exists at least one credit for v in d; and 3)
the invariants mentioned in the definition of safety of commands also hold
during the execution of any thread in t.
Lemma 7 (Soundness of the safety of threads).
safetn t p o d⇒ safen t dpunionmultipinve
where pinv provides the invariants of all the locks in p and pinv that have not
been acquired, and dpe converts the permission heap p to its coresponding heap.
Proof. By induction on n and lemma 8.
Lemma 8 (Valid configuration does not deadlock). Assuming a given config-
uration extended by a set of thread-obligation pairs, namely o, such that 1) for
any lock z that has been acquired or any condition vairable z for which a thread
is waiting, there exists a thread tid such that (tid, z)∈o; and 2) for any (tid, z)∈o
the thread tid is not terminated; and 3) if any thread tid in this configuration is
trying to acquire a lock z or waiting for a condition variable z then the waiting
level of z is lower than the waiting levels of obligations of tid in o; then this
configuration does not deadlock.
Proof. By contradiction: We assume that there is no progress in the configura-
tion but there is still a thread id such that t(id)=c. Assuming that heap and
thread pool have an infinite capacity, c is either c=acquire(z), where z has been
already acquired, or c=sleep(z, l). By 1, o contains at least one element, and
consequently, there should exist some (tidmin, zmin)∈o such that the waiting
level of zmin, namely wmin, is the minimum waiting level of all obligations in
o. By 2, there should exist a command c′ such that t(tidmin)=c′, and since
there is no progress in this configuration there should exist a resource z with
waiting level wz such that c
′ is either acquire(z), where z has been already ac-
quired, or asleep(z, l′). By 1, there is an obligation for z and by 3, wz should
be strictly lower than the waiting levels of all obligations of tidmin, including
zmin. Consequently, wz<wmin that contradicts the assumption claiming wmin
is the minimum waiting level of all obligations.
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